For one thing, those job gains have been pretty darn small, and they haven’t been enough to drive down the unemployment rate.  Outmigration and a shrinking labor force are the reasons that California’s unemployment rate is declining.

We’ve also seen this picture before.  Almost a year ago, we commenced five months of increasing jobs, and stronger growth than we are currently seeing.  Then, the growth stopped.  We saw three out of five months with declining jobs.

This is what data looks like when an economy is bouncing along the bottom.  Long sustained periods of positive data, or negative data for that matter, just don’t happen.  We get some good data, sometimes very good.  Then some bad data comes along.  The key is not to let the good data get you too excited, nor do you want to let the bad data depress you too much.

Absent a new recession, caused by, say, the collapse of the Eurozone or an oil supply interruption, California is in for a long slow recovery.

This reality is reflected in demographic data.  Just last week, the Los Angeles Times had an article with the headline “Proportion of California’s transplant population reaches 100-year low.”  People go where the opportunity is, and unfortunately, it isn’t in California these days.

Productivity has been the source of most of the changes. Jobs data get revised too, but we haven’t seen revisions near the size as we’ve seen for GDP, and GDP growth is the sum of employment growth and productivity growth.

Recently, the initial estimate for 2011’s third-quarter GDP growth was revised downward from a 2.5 percent annual growth rate to only a 2.0 percent annual growth rate.

Still, even a 2.0 percent growth rate represents a nice pickup from the extraordinarily weak first two quarters. Unfortunately, much of that improvement came in the form of productivity growth rather than job growth.

It confirms our judgment last summer, when we expected the Country to avoid the second dip so many forecasters expected after the August data revisions to the first two quarters’ GDP data.

That doesn’t mean we’re out of the woods yet. The probability of one of both of two very serious events that we’ve been warning about for months seems to be increasing daily.

A significant interruption in oil supply from the Middle East would have catastrophic impacts on Western economies. The probability of such an interruption is becoming alarmingly high, in our estimation.  A week or so ago, there were headlines that a natural gas line in Egypt was sabotaged, the Kuwaiti government has collapsed, and Syrian atrocities are continuing, perhaps increasing. The likelihood of an oil-supply interruption is high, and the economic impacts of an interruption are very serious. Economic recession will affect all developed economies.

The other risk is a financial crisis associated with the breakup of the Eurozone. While the markets are giddy today with the prospect of yet more Eurozone bailouts, the bailouts are only bandages.

Fundamentally, the Eurozone is a contradiction that cannot be sustained. Some countries will have to leave it. When they do, there will be losses. Financial institutions and governments will face stresses not seen since September 2008. The resulting recession will be serious and widespread.

Productivity used to have a cyclical component. It fell early in a recession, and it rose early in the recovery. The early-recession fall resulted from falling sales and no employment change. The idea is that businesses see the sales decline, but don’t know if it is temporary. So, they don’t layoff for a while and productivity falls.

The early-recovery productivity growth is similar. A business sees increasing sales, but is unsure if it is permanent. So, they avoid adding to payroll until they are confident that the higher sales will be maintained.

All that went away with the past two recessions. In these recessions, productivity growth was relentless, increasing quarter after quarter. Consequently, our models cannot effectively use the new productivity information. (Don’t ask why. It is a statistical answer.)

Some, very few actually, are discounting the new jobs data, because it included the Verizon strike. We note that it also included the return of Minnesota’s government workers, significantly reducing the Verizon impact.

There are other reasons to be concerned about the new jobs data. A big one is that the previous two months were revised down. June was revised down 26,000 jobs (56 percent) to only 20,000, while July was revised down a whopping 32,000 jobs (27 percent) to 85,000. These revisions imply that the initial estimate is currently biased high, implying in turn that we actually lost jobs in August.

The combination of falling productivity and job losses is a powerful indicator that the second dip may be here or coming very soon.

We believed that the United States economy, absent some outside shock, would slowly accelerate.

Today, we’re not so sure.  As Dan says, “Today, we know more about the truth.”

We have to run the new data through our model to be precise about the prospects for a new recession, and we’ll be doing that soon.  In the meantime, you have to believe that this is a very risky time for our economy.

This should cause Washington to be more determined to extend the debt ceiling.  Perceptions of the risks of a new recession have increased.  That makes it more likely that Washington will be blamed if they do not raise the debt ceiling.

If you are looking for a summary statistic on the United States economy, I recommend you consider bank charge-offs. These are the loans that banks have written off their books, because the probability of collecting them is so low. It doesn’t mean that the borrowers are off the hook, or that the bank will stop trying to collect the loan. It only means that a bank can’t consider a charged-off loan an asset.

Most people use GDP growth as a summary statistic for the economy, which leads to the current situation where policy makers and talking heads have declared a recovery while millions who have been unemployed for months or years continue to be unemployed. Indeed there were two recessions, based on GDP, in the 1960s where all of the job losses occurred after the recession was declared officially over.

OK, so why not use jobs as an indicator of prosperity? Actually, I’m sympathetic to that. It is certainly a better indicator of well being than is GDP. However, I think that charge-offs, particularly now, give us a little more information. Jobs tell us what businesses are doing. Charge-off data tell, at least in some sense, what business can do. That’s because banks don’t lend much when charge-offs are high, and without loans, businesses can’t grow.
So, what are bank charge-off data telling us?

They are telling us that a robust recovery is a ways off. Below is a history of real, inflation adjusted, bank charge-offs:

Prior to 2007, quarterly bank charge-offs had never exceeded $15 billion a quarter in today’s dollars. Then, they skyrocketed to almost $60 billion a quarter. Since then, bank charge-offs have fallen, but they remain well above $40 billion a quarter. You have to conclude that our banking system is still crippled.
This impacts small business much more than it impacts big business. Big businesses have direct access to capital markets and don’t need financial intermediation.

There are more reasons to be bearish on American small business growth. People who own small business own real estate, much more than the typical American. About 98 percent of all small business owners own their own home, but only about 66.5 percent of all American households own their own home. This means that small business was disproportionally hurt by the collapse in real estate values. Their balance sheet was suddenly over-leveraged, impairing their willingness and ability to borrow.

The inability of small business to use real estate equity to finance growth has impacts that are exacerbated by a banking sector that has forgotten how to lend to small business without the use of real estate as a secondary repayment source.

It used to be that small business had access to lines of credit secured by inventories or receivables. These were expensive loans, but they did not require real estate equity for the firm to grow, and in cyclical businesses they were self-liquidating, something that bankers just loved.

As real estate values climbed, banks lowered costs by moving away from these loans. Consequently, while some inventory and receivable financing remains, it is less important than it used to be. Perhaps worse, many bankers don’t know how to make and supervise inventory and receivable lines of credit. It was always a specialty. Today, asset-based lending, as this type of lending is referred to, is an almost forgotten specialty.

Still, those banks that are well enough capitalized to be aggressively seeking lending opportunities would be well advised to consider setting up asset-based lending units. It may be the only way for them to significantly increase loan volume in the near term. It would also be a service to small business and the economic well being of all of us.
The other alternative for small business expansion would be for real estate values to suddenly increase. That is not going to happen in this or next year. I go into the reasons more in the Real Estate Essay, but I have another summary statistic for you, Home Ownership Rates.

Home ownership in the United States is generally about 64 percent. That is about 64 percent of households own the home they live in. When the homeownership rate gets much above 64 percent, we have problems in our financial sector. Remember the Savings and Loan Crisis?

The United States homeownership rate climbed during the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, until they peaked at over 69 percent. Since then, it has fallen, but not by enough. Until the United States home ownership ratio drops to below 65 percent, there will be no generalized upward pressure for home prices.

I think we have to conclude that this recovery is weak, because the normal drivers of a robust recovery, small business and real estate, can’t contribute.

Seeing a problem and knowing how to solve it are two different things.  So, we’re going to see lots of silly ideas proposed.  We’ll see demands for more government spending.  We’ll see demands for less government spending.  We’ll see demands for higher taxes.  We’ll see demands for lower taxes.  We’ll see demands for more consumer spending.  We’ll see demands for more consumer saving.

All of these recommendations can’t be correct.  In fact, they are all beside the point.  I’m not saying the proposals won’t have any impact.  They will, but the impacts will either be marginal or they will be some time in the future.  Our problem is immediate and very serious.  Here’s what we need to do to avoid a lost decade:

• Fix the financial sector
• Stop paying interest on deposits at the Fed
• Lower effective borrowing costs with an investment tax credit
• Reduce regulatory uncertainty and big-business bias
• Increase immigration

Any vigorous recovery needs a vigorous financial sector, and ours is not.  Fed policy has been ineffective, because the money multiplier has tanked, even as the monetary base soared.  There are two reasons for this: The Fed is paying banks to deposit at the Fed, and the banks–burdened with over-leveraged balance sheets, huge charge-offs, and bad assets–are in no shape to lend.  Fix the banks, and stop encouraging them to park money in Washington, and we’ll have a start on real recovery.

We have an investment problem; there isn’t any.  That’s because, even at zero, borrowing costs exceed expected returns on investments, and the future regulatory environment is extremely uncertain.  We can’t lower interest rates below zero, but an investment tax credit would effectively lower borrowing costs.  Do that and remove regulatory uncertainty, and our businesses will invest.  While we’re at it, let’s reduce big business’ regulatory advantage.

Finally, we don’t have any problems that couldn’t be fixed by a few million new immigrants.  We’d see an immediate increase in housing demand and construction.  Our inner cities would be renewed.  Our economy would see a burst of creativity, energy, and new business formation.

A year ago we were hearing all about green shoots. Analysts claimed to find them everywhere.
Today, we never see the term. In fact, there seems to be a growing malaise. By the end of June the first quarter’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimate was revised downward a full half a percent, to 2.7 percent. Pundits are depressed. Our President and Secretary of the Treasury are telling the world that the United States cannot lead the world to sustained economic growth. Our Vice President announced that “there’s no possibility to restore eight million jobs lost in the Great Recession.” Our stock markets are down and volatile. Risk premiums have soared.

What happened?

Reality happened. The green shoots were always ephemeral, the result of massive government spending increases or temporary government programs. We had housing stimulus programs. We had Cash for Clunkers. We had foreclosure programs. We had bailouts.

The increased spending and the various programs had an impact. Because of the way GDP is calculated, an increase in government spending results in an increase in GDP, but that is today’s GDP, not tomorrow’s. Tomorrow’s economic growth is a result of investment today, investment in physical capital, technology, and human capital.

To the extent that government spending detracts from those investments, the growth we saw was cannibalized from the future. For example, the housing stimulus programs served only to change the timing of real estate purchases. Sales fell when the programs ended.

Even worse, some programs resulted in temporary GDP growth, but were actually detrimental to long-term economic growth. The Cash for Clunkers program destroyed capital, since perfectly good cars were crushed. The foreclosure prevention programs delayed the needed decline in home ownership rates.

The bailouts prevented assets from being transferred to more productive uses. Bailouts are inefficient, and they prolong periods of economic weakness. Uncertainty and risk premiums remain elevated, holding investment to a minimum, limiting short-term and long-term economic growth. They also leave a hangover of debt, which limits future growth.

None of the programs addressed the underlying problems of the current economic circumstances, or paved the way for sustained economic growth. The immediate problem was that businesses, consumers, and governments were over-leveraged after September 2008’s asset-value collapse. The longer-term problem was insufficient investment, a result of years of credit-fueled consumption.

What was needed was investment. What was provided was more credit-fueled consumption. You might be able to borrow your way to prosperity, but to do that you better be investing the borrowed funds. We didn’t do that. Instead we used the government as a bank to increase consumption. Credit-based consumption is not the way to long-term prosperity, regardless of who does the borrowing.

And, while it appears that most of the decline in asset values has ended, over-leverage is still with us. Indeed, the increase in government leverage makes it more difficult to employ effective government intervention, government investment in productivity-enhancing capital and technology, and investment tax credits.

Add to these factors the millions of American households, employed and unemployed, that remain over-leveraged. Millions of consumers have been unemployed for months, and many of those still working are uncertain about their future employment. Those who have the income to do so are attempting to pay down debt, and to reduce consumption in the process. The consumer is not likely to soon be a source of rapid economic growth.

So, we have most or all of the problems of a year ago, but now, because of increased government debt, we have fewer options. Even worse, we now have new problems that were not present in September 2008.

Today, sovereign default risks are significant and increasing. While potential sovereign debt problems in Europe have received a great deal of attention, the problems are not limited to the continent. Japan continues to have very high debt and deficits. Several U.S. states could also default. A failure of an American state is likely to have impacts very similar to the failure of a small European country.

I don’t believe that the failure of a country is the most likely outcome, however. Instead, expect to see more international bailouts, just as you can expect to see the federal government bailout several American states.

Our options are limited, but we do have one option that would provide immediate and sustained economic growth without increasing leverage. That option would be a massive increase in immigration.

The initial benefits of a new wave of immigration would be seen remarkably quickly. Housing demand would increase, leading to renewed vigor in our real estate markets and the construction industry. Our inner cities would be renewed, as they always have been by immigration waves. New business formations would soar. The tax base would increase, helping to fund debt repayment and baby-boomer retirements.

Many would oppose such an immigration increase. They worry about increasing job competition, unemployment, crime, and even more demand on welfare programs.

These fears are misplaced. Criminals are easily sorted out by effective screening processes. People don’t migrate for welfare benefits, but if this is a concern, it is easy to deny immigrant access to social programs for some number of years after immigration. Similarly, people don’t migrate to be unemployed, and unemployment benefits can be denied to immigrants.

People migrate to more effectively use their human and physical capital, their technology, and their labor. Effectively, immigration would provide new capital, technology, and labor. This is exactly what we need, and it is free. Immigration has served America well in the past. It can serve us well today.

The California March unemployment rate increased to 12.6 percent from 12.5 percent in February. Since August of 2009 the unemployment rate has climbed 60 basis points, and there has not been any interim month of recovery. The unemployment rate would likely be even greater if not for net domestic out-migration.

The year-on-year job growth rate continued improving, that is to say the declines are not as big, extending a trend that started in January 2010. Improvements in the year-on-year job growth rates since January have been fairly consistent. The problem is that we started from losses of seven percent. Last year’s seven percent job losses were likely to be the worst in the California’s job market history. The year-on-year growth rate declines were 3.7 percent in February, and 3.1 percent in March.

Month-on-month job growth, the more volatile measure, jumped 570 basis points from December 2009 to January 2010. After the January gains, the month-on-month measure slowed to barely positive numbers in February and March.

The question of recovery is in the air, and with the March California jobs report we might hope to claim that we are past the worse of the recession. However, even though the job growth decline is improving, the level of jobs is still falling relative to last year. If the rate of improvement in the year-on-year job growth rate continues, we would not arrive at positive job growth until August 2010. As well, the unemployment rate will continue to remain high for some time.

A negative risk factor is the public sector. Despite the fact that the state has a very large structural budget deficit, public sector job losses have been much smaller than for the private sector thus far in this cycle. Public sector jobs could be the other shoe to drop. If this did happen, it would lengthen and weaken the return to growth.

The idea has merit, and now might be a good time to implement it. Business investment has been extraordinarily weak for a long time now. Businesses may be feeling the lack of investment, but they are unwilling to invest now, because of uncertainty about the recovery. A tax credit might be just what is needed to push some of them into investing. It would also encourage hiring. Capital and labor are compliments. More capital would improve the productivity of labor, reducing the cost of hiring.

Certainly, it would be better to run a deficit to fund investment than continue the existing program of funding current consumption with deficits. This policy would imply a higher steady-state level of future capital stock than with the current policy, with greater future productive capacity. The higher future capital stock means the economy would have more resources available for consumption, further investment, or (heaven forbid) paying down debt.

New unemployment claims also rose to 444,000, again exceeding “consensus expectations.”

There was also a report that will receive much less attention, but it is important. Inventories increased in November, the most recent month for which data are available. If inventories were increasing over the Christmas shopping season, and sales were declining, retailers ended the year with excessive inventory. That means reduced production in the first and second quarters of 2010.

2009’s third quarter output (GDP) growth was positive, and many expect a very impressive positive number for the fourth quarter, some as high as five percent. If the fourth quarter does come in with a strong GDP growth rate, it will be hailed as the harbinger of a soon-to-be-realized vigorous recovery.

Don’t buy that, and you won’t be disappointed.

That vigorous recovery may eventually come, but it is unlikely to come in 2010. Whatever growth generated in second-half of 2009 was government-supported consumption, ephemeral, not a solid foundation for economic growth, certainly not the basis for sustained vigorous job growth.

A vigorous recovery will be a result of investment, technological growth, and improved productivity. Recent productivity numbers have been encouraging, but in large part, they are probably the result of firms downsizing. Technological growth and solid job growth require investment, and that is the problem.

Our banks are in no condition to fund any vigorous expansion. Indeed, bank loans have been declining since October 2008. Businesses and consumers remain over-leveraged, unable to increase spending on consumption, unable to invest, desperately trying to reduce debt.

We won’t see a vigorous recovery until balance sheets are improved and banks can lend.

Government programs haven’t helped. Most of the spending programs have been consumption based instead of investment based. Some have been outright counterproductive, programs such as foreclosure-delay, paying interest on bank deposits at the Fed, and cash for clunkers. Even worse, the banking problem has been ignored, and now new taxes on banks are being discussed. That is as bad an idea as I’ve heard in a long time.