Productivity has been the source of most of the changes. Jobs data get revised too, but we haven’t seen revisions near the size as we’ve seen for GDP, and GDP growth is the sum of employment growth and productivity growth.

Recently, the initial estimate for 2011’s third-quarter GDP growth was revised downward from a 2.5 percent annual growth rate to only a 2.0 percent annual growth rate.

Still, even a 2.0 percent growth rate represents a nice pickup from the extraordinarily weak first two quarters. Unfortunately, much of that improvement came in the form of productivity growth rather than job growth.

It confirms our judgment last summer, when we expected the Country to avoid the second dip so many forecasters expected after the August data revisions to the first two quarters’ GDP data.

That doesn’t mean we’re out of the woods yet. The probability of one of both of two very serious events that we’ve been warning about for months seems to be increasing daily.

A significant interruption in oil supply from the Middle East would have catastrophic impacts on Western economies. The probability of such an interruption is becoming alarmingly high, in our estimation.  A week or so ago, there were headlines that a natural gas line in Egypt was sabotaged, the Kuwaiti government has collapsed, and Syrian atrocities are continuing, perhaps increasing. The likelihood of an oil-supply interruption is high, and the economic impacts of an interruption are very serious. Economic recession will affect all developed economies.

The other risk is a financial crisis associated with the breakup of the Eurozone. While the markets are giddy today with the prospect of yet more Eurozone bailouts, the bailouts are only bandages.

Fundamentally, the Eurozone is a contradiction that cannot be sustained. Some countries will have to leave it. When they do, there will be losses. Financial institutions and governments will face stresses not seen since September 2008. The resulting recession will be serious and widespread.

The jump in consumption growth from second quarter’s rate, which was 0.7 percent, implied that the savings rate fell. The BEA measure of the savings rate fell a full percent, from 5.1 percent to 4.1 percent. The economic growth estimate of 2.5 percent, with the approximate job growth estimate of about one percent, implies that output per worker growth was positive again in third quarter. It was negative in the second quarter.

What does all this mean?

Turning to the output per worker first, this measure of gross labor productivity, which contracted in quarters 1 and 2, increased in third quarter. Increasing labor productivity is a key driver of per-capita income growth, and it is a feature of increased innovation in production. It appears likely now that the negative labor productivity of quarters 1 and 2 were just temporary, and that productivity is returning to trend. If true, economic growth will benefit.

I am pleased to see the investment in structures and equipment/software. Investment raises the productive capacity of the future economy, thereby providing greater choice for either investing or consuming in the future.

The rise in consumption and fall in savings worries me. While it benefits current growth, it is likely to prolong the balance sheet rebuilding that I feel is necessary to ensure healthy growth in the future.

The question of which way the savings rate will go is also one of the big macroeconomic forecasting challenges of the day. Some Economists argue that because of the Great Recession, households will see that they need to rebuild their balance sheet, in this case mostly by reducing liabilities. Some Economists argue that the baby boomer generation, still very influential on the economy, is culturally incapable of saving. Both arguments have merits, and it is a tough call.

From a forecasting perspective, it is hard for the econometrician to see the factors that might drive the decision wether or not to save. The relevant factors are likely to include: household structure (married or not, kids or not), age, employment history, wealth level, debt level, type of debt, education level, and skill level.

Our forecast for third quarter GDP, 0.6 percent, was really low, and much of the error stems from our consumption/savings forecast. Our forecast presumed a similar savings rate to second quarter, and thus a very slow consumption growth rate. Given that it is difficult for me as a forecaster to see the above-mentioned savings-decision factors, I am not sure if my forecast was based on what was more likely, or if it was simply what I hoped.

Most indicators of household debt indicate to me that debt levels are still too high. As a result I hold to my belief that long-run United States economic growth will rise if households save now, i.e. pay off their liabilities. However, I am not sure if or when this will happen.

Productivity used to have a cyclical component. It fell early in a recession, and it rose early in the recovery. The early-recession fall resulted from falling sales and no employment change. The idea is that businesses see the sales decline, but don’t know if it is temporary. So, they don’t layoff for a while and productivity falls.

The early-recovery productivity growth is similar. A business sees increasing sales, but is unsure if it is permanent. So, they avoid adding to payroll until they are confident that the higher sales will be maintained.

All that went away with the past two recessions. In these recessions, productivity growth was relentless, increasing quarter after quarter. Consequently, our models cannot effectively use the new productivity information. (Don’t ask why. It is a statistical answer.)

Some, very few actually, are discounting the new jobs data, because it included the Verizon strike. We note that it also included the return of Minnesota’s government workers, significantly reducing the Verizon impact.

There are other reasons to be concerned about the new jobs data. A big one is that the previous two months were revised down. June was revised down 26,000 jobs (56 percent) to only 20,000, while July was revised down a whopping 32,000 jobs (27 percent) to 85,000. These revisions imply that the initial estimate is currently biased high, implying in turn that we actually lost jobs in August.

The combination of falling productivity and job losses is a powerful indicator that the second dip may be here or coming very soon.

Downward revisions to United States gross domestic product (GDP) have driven most of the revisions. For about two years, we had trouble with the original GDP estimates. Our jobs forecasts were pretty accurate, but we forecasted productivity growth and consumer spending growth below the initial estimates. This caused us enough grief that we’ve been reviewing our models. Well, the revised numbers are entirely consistent with our original models.

Downward revisions to productivity growth and consumer spending are what drove the downward GDP revisions.

Enough bragging. What is happening to the economy? We’re seeing a weak recovery.
Increasing numbers of forecasters, spooked by weak numbers and downward revisions, are now forecasting a double-dip in the near future. We don’t think that is the most likely case.

We’ve said all along that this would be a weak and inconsistent recession, and that appears to be what we are seeing. Some encouraging data might come in this week. The next week could see weak data. This is exactly what we expect to see in a recovery where financial institutions are wounded, real estate is weak, and consumers over extended.

So, we don’t expect a double-dip recession. We expect continued slow growth, accompanied by weak real estate markets, weak consumer spending, slow job growth, and persistent high unemployment.

That would be the good news and the bad news.

Another recession is in our future though, and not just because the business cycle has not been repealed. However, the timing of the next recession is really difficult to forecast, because in part, the timing will probably be politically driven.

I have become convinced that the culmination of Europe’s problems will be a partial breakup of the Eurozone. Perhaps it will be complete breakup. It really doesn’t matter.

Any breakup will almost surely be accompanied by financial and political crises. These crises will initiate a new recession, one that will be impacting an already weakened economy. It’s likely to be very painful.

We believed that the United States economy, absent some outside shock, would slowly accelerate.

Today, we’re not so sure.  As Dan says, “Today, we know more about the truth.”

We have to run the new data through our model to be precise about the prospects for a new recession, and we’ll be doing that soon.  In the meantime, you have to believe that this is a very risky time for our economy.

This should cause Washington to be more determined to extend the debt ceiling.  Perceptions of the risks of a new recession have increased.  That makes it more likely that Washington will be blamed if they do not raise the debt ceiling.

At the same time we have had other measures of economic performance that have been dismal. The housing market is one high-profile example. Most other real estate categories are as weak as the housing sector. Banking is hardly better, with 365 closures since the crises began and 13 closures in April this year alone, which is a recent monthly high. Bank chargeoffs continue to maintain the blistering pace of over $40 billion a quarter. The labor market has been horrible, with weak job gains and high unemployment levels. Finally, household debt levels are still too high.

To some extent I can reconcile these differences. The positive results have been driven mostly by larger and corporate company results. The negative results are mostly a reflection that small companies have not been able to grow since early 2008. We understand the gap between large and small businesses has widened. This is due to increased regulation and tighter credit markets, which hurt small businesses much more than large corporations.

However, to another extent I am confused. I had hypothesized in 2009 that households would rebuild their balance sheets to pare down debt. However, this has not happened. This particular aspect of the economy is hard to forecast and has significant implications. It can be boiled down to this: will the household sector savings rate be maintained at a high enough rate to bring their debt levels down or not? This leads to an economic policy question: should Federal economic policy add the goal of incentivizing household savings?

If you are looking for a summary statistic on the United States economy, I recommend you consider bank charge-offs. These are the loans that banks have written off their books, because the probability of collecting them is so low. It doesn’t mean that the borrowers are off the hook, or that the bank will stop trying to collect the loan. It only means that a bank can’t consider a charged-off loan an asset.

Most people use GDP growth as a summary statistic for the economy, which leads to the current situation where policy makers and talking heads have declared a recovery while millions who have been unemployed for months or years continue to be unemployed. Indeed there were two recessions, based on GDP, in the 1960s where all of the job losses occurred after the recession was declared officially over.

OK, so why not use jobs as an indicator of prosperity? Actually, I’m sympathetic to that. It is certainly a better indicator of well being than is GDP. However, I think that charge-offs, particularly now, give us a little more information. Jobs tell us what businesses are doing. Charge-off data tell, at least in some sense, what business can do. That’s because banks don’t lend much when charge-offs are high, and without loans, businesses can’t grow.
So, what are bank charge-off data telling us?

They are telling us that a robust recovery is a ways off. Below is a history of real, inflation adjusted, bank charge-offs:

Prior to 2007, quarterly bank charge-offs had never exceeded $15 billion a quarter in today’s dollars. Then, they skyrocketed to almost $60 billion a quarter. Since then, bank charge-offs have fallen, but they remain well above $40 billion a quarter. You have to conclude that our banking system is still crippled.
This impacts small business much more than it impacts big business. Big businesses have direct access to capital markets and don’t need financial intermediation.

There are more reasons to be bearish on American small business growth. People who own small business own real estate, much more than the typical American. About 98 percent of all small business owners own their own home, but only about 66.5 percent of all American households own their own home. This means that small business was disproportionally hurt by the collapse in real estate values. Their balance sheet was suddenly over-leveraged, impairing their willingness and ability to borrow.

The inability of small business to use real estate equity to finance growth has impacts that are exacerbated by a banking sector that has forgotten how to lend to small business without the use of real estate as a secondary repayment source.

It used to be that small business had access to lines of credit secured by inventories or receivables. These were expensive loans, but they did not require real estate equity for the firm to grow, and in cyclical businesses they were self-liquidating, something that bankers just loved.

As real estate values climbed, banks lowered costs by moving away from these loans. Consequently, while some inventory and receivable financing remains, it is less important than it used to be. Perhaps worse, many bankers don’t know how to make and supervise inventory and receivable lines of credit. It was always a specialty. Today, asset-based lending, as this type of lending is referred to, is an almost forgotten specialty.

Still, those banks that are well enough capitalized to be aggressively seeking lending opportunities would be well advised to consider setting up asset-based lending units. It may be the only way for them to significantly increase loan volume in the near term. It would also be a service to small business and the economic well being of all of us.
The other alternative for small business expansion would be for real estate values to suddenly increase. That is not going to happen in this or next year. I go into the reasons more in the Real Estate Essay, but I have another summary statistic for you, Home Ownership Rates.

Home ownership in the United States is generally about 64 percent. That is about 64 percent of households own the home they live in. When the homeownership rate gets much above 64 percent, we have problems in our financial sector. Remember the Savings and Loan Crisis?

The United States homeownership rate climbed during the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, until they peaked at over 69 percent. Since then, it has fallen, but not by enough. Until the United States home ownership ratio drops to below 65 percent, there will be no generalized upward pressure for home prices.

I think we have to conclude that this recovery is weak, because the normal drivers of a robust recovery, small business and real estate, can’t contribute.

I was shocked that almost everyone complained about increased bureaucracy and regulation.  For example, the farmer’s complaints included a “social responsibility” audit.  Even people who worked for quasi-government or government funded enterprises complained about new requirements.  Only the accountant was happy; regulation increases his business.

Complaints about regulation and bureaucracy are common.  I hear them all the time.  However, I’ve never seen such widespread complaints.  In a group of this size, I would expect maybe three people to complain about regulation, but at this meeting, it was practically universal.

This doesn’t bode well for the recovery.  However well intentioned, new broad-based regulatory requirements will serve as sand scattered throughout the gears of economic activity.  It creates additional costs–costs that are likely to exceed the benefits–and uncertainty.  This is exactly the opposite of what we need for robust growth.

It also doesn’t bode well for our forecast.  We have a very difficult time bringing this type of thing into our models.  It probably means that our models are a bit optimistic, and that is a bit scary.

Seeing a problem and knowing how to solve it are two different things.  So, we’re going to see lots of silly ideas proposed.  We’ll see demands for more government spending.  We’ll see demands for less government spending.  We’ll see demands for higher taxes.  We’ll see demands for lower taxes.  We’ll see demands for more consumer spending.  We’ll see demands for more consumer saving.

All of these recommendations can’t be correct.  In fact, they are all beside the point.  I’m not saying the proposals won’t have any impact.  They will, but the impacts will either be marginal or they will be some time in the future.  Our problem is immediate and very serious.  Here’s what we need to do to avoid a lost decade:

• Fix the financial sector
• Stop paying interest on deposits at the Fed
• Lower effective borrowing costs with an investment tax credit
• Reduce regulatory uncertainty and big-business bias
• Increase immigration

Any vigorous recovery needs a vigorous financial sector, and ours is not.  Fed policy has been ineffective, because the money multiplier has tanked, even as the monetary base soared.  There are two reasons for this: The Fed is paying banks to deposit at the Fed, and the banks–burdened with over-leveraged balance sheets, huge charge-offs, and bad assets–are in no shape to lend.  Fix the banks, and stop encouraging them to park money in Washington, and we’ll have a start on real recovery.

We have an investment problem; there isn’t any.  That’s because, even at zero, borrowing costs exceed expected returns on investments, and the future regulatory environment is extremely uncertain.  We can’t lower interest rates below zero, but an investment tax credit would effectively lower borrowing costs.  Do that and remove regulatory uncertainty, and our businesses will invest.  While we’re at it, let’s reduce big business’ regulatory advantage.

Finally, we don’t have any problems that couldn’t be fixed by a few million new immigrants.  We’d see an immediate increase in housing demand and construction.  Our inner cities would be renewed.  Our economy would see a burst of creativity, energy, and new business formation.

“After nearly two years of global economic and financial upheaval, shockwaves are still being felt, as we have seen with recent developments in Europe and the resulting financial market volatility,” Naoyuki Shinohara, the IMF’s deputy managing director, said in Singapore on Wednesday. “The global outlook remains unusually uncertain and downside risks have risen significantly.”

They are right in that uncertainty and risk are high.  I don’t think they’ve changed much, though, in recent weeks.   What has changed has been people’s perception of the risk.

For some reason, unfathomable to me, people started getting giddy about our economic prospects last August or so.  There were some good data points, but you had to look at them only in a cursory manner, and you had to ignore other discouraging data to believe we were headed for a robust recovery.

A more in-depth analysis and a broad look at the data gave no reason for a giddy attack.  The gains were mostly transitory, driven by temporary government programs.  Consumers, businesses, and governments were still over-leveraged.  The financial sector was still weak.

Still, it became consensus that our economic challenges were behind us.  The stock markets soared, and this was taken as another sign of economic prosperity just around the corner.

Now, the stock markets are down again, and some economists are talking about new risk.  I’d say the risks were there all along, and our forecast reflected those risks.