Let’s call the disease bailoutitis. It is not fatal, but it leads to an extended period of serious constipation, near-death experiences, and eventually, a painful hangover.

Bailouts, as we are currently performing them, amount to free insurance. You don’t see free insurance offered very often, for good reason. It doesn’t matter how much money you start with, you eventually run out of money offering free insurance, even without a moral hazard problem. The math just doesn’t provide for any other outcome.

Then what? Well something fails and we have a collapse, something like what followed Lehman Brothers collapse, only worse, something like what the bailouts are intended to avoid, only worse. By propping up countries, states, and companies, we are only postponing our problem, a problem that will be much larger because of our postponement.

There are other issues. With every bailout we are rewarding a bad player by taxing a good player, creating terrible incentives and diverting funds from beneficial uses.

Now, we’re in a Catch 22 situation. We’ve created the expectation of bailouts, and the incentives have had their effect. There will be failures and financial crises if we stop bailing out bad players. There will be failure and financial crises if we don’t stop bailing out bad players. The lower-cost option is to stop bailing out the bad players now.

How will the Fed raise the short-term market interest rate? The old-fashioned way of tightening monetary policy is to shrink the amount of reserves outstanding by selling assets. Over the past one and a half years, the Fed has piled on securities with long maturities and exposed itself to credit risk. If it sold those assets, it would post considerable losses, deadly to the institution’s already fragile reputation in the current political climate. Instead, the Fed will raise the rate it pays on excess reserves (or deposits of banks at the Fed). Banks will pull up interest rates in the money market as the alternative use of reserves—parking them at the Fed—becomes more remunerative.

Who at the Fed will raise the short-term market interest rate? Congress explicitly gave the authority to raise the interest rate on excess reserves to the Board of Governors (or the seven appointed officials who work in Washington), not the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC, or the board governors and a subset of reserve bank presidents who normally vote on reserve conditions). Thus, the balance of power within the Fed will shift toward the governors when the instrument of policy becomes the interest rate on reserves. (Bernanke elided this issue in his recent testimony when he left the impression that the FOMC will still set policy in conjunction with the board. In fact, the Federal Reserve Act prohibits the board from delegating monetary policy to others.) This matters because two slots on the board are currently open, giving the White House an important opportunity to shape monetary policy through future nominations. Indeed, given natural turnover among governors, President Obama will probably be able to appoint a majority of the board in a single term of office.

In the first paragraph, Vince highlights the flipside of quantitative easing. The Fed bought a bunch of long-term financial assets, the value of which will go down when interest rates go up. Now, owning these assets is a constraint on Fed actions. There is already plenty of pressure to reduce the already-compromised “Fed independence.” Selling those assets at a loss will further increase pressure for more congressional oversight.

This means the Fed will control inflationary pressure by increasing the rate they pay on excess bank deposits at the Fed. That will work, but it will likely have a more negative impact on economic activity than traditional methods. With high risk-free yields at the Fed, banks, already under regulatory pressure, undercapitalized, and risk averse after the 2008 meltdown, will have no incentive to lend. Small business, which traditionally funded growth with bank loans, will have difficulty obtaining capital. Big business, with direct access to debt and equity markets, will have easier access.

Economic growth, therefore, will probably be slower than under traditional Fed tightening, and it will be biased toward big business. Small business, handicapped by an uneven playing field, will almost surely decline as a percentage of business activity.

The second paragraph is important, because it implies that Fed policy will become more political. Given current and projected United States debts levels, political pressure to monetarize the debt will be strong. As debt levels and interest rates increase, interest costs will soar, as will the pressure to inflate. Will a more politicized Fed resist that pressure? I wouldn’t bet on it.

Jeff isn’t buying any of this. He says:

It seems peculiar to me that the Fed would conduct its monetary policy with a major constraint being the effect on its own profitability. While it might be embarrassing to sell some securities at a loss, it would be even more embarrassing to have a portfolio like the thrifts in the 1980s: long-term fixed rate assets funded with short-term liabilities in a rising rate environment. That would look really stupid.

Good point. We’ll see.

Banks can borrow from the Fed at rates near zero. Then, they can purchase Treasuries for about three percent. Voila, banks have a three percent risk-free return, and no incentive to lend to business.

The conclusion is that the Fed has rates too low.

I disagree.

First, we need to acknowledge that many banks are in no condition to be taking risks, and many of their customers are in no condition to be assuming additional debt. Also, the Fed is paying interest on excess deposits, which is silly, and it complicates the analysis. However, even if banks could lend, borrowers could borrow, and the Fed didn’t pay interest on excess reserves, I don’t think the above analysis is correct.

The easiest way to think about the situation is to ask: what would the banks be doing if there were no Treasuries to buy? They would be investing in something else, something like loaning to businesses and consumers. This is pretty much the definition of crowding out.

The fact is that downside risk still dominates the forecast, and the Fed needs to keep interest rates low, at least for a while longer. If our banks were healthy, this would be a clear-cut example of crowding out. The banks aren’t healthy, but I’m thinking some crowding out is definitely happening.

I’m as concerned as anyone about total government spending and the deficit. I’m probably more concerned than most about bank lending to business. But, conspiracy isn’t the problem.

Part one of Melloan’s theory is that the Fed is causing banks to be excessively risk averse. He says “The Federal Reserve, which supervises some 7,000 banks, has been telling bankers that they must cut risk.”

The FDIC reported today that there are 552 banks on their problem list. Banks have been charging off $40 to $50 billion per quarter in loans for a year now. Capital has been eroded, and banks are way overleveraged, in part because of excessive risk taking. You think that maybe banks should be more risk averse today? You think that maybe there is a rational reason for banks to lend less to business and purchase more government securities?

The real problem is not some government conspiracy. The real problem is the government’s quiescence.

Too many of our banks are zombies, and we face something like Japan’s lost decade if we don’t fix them. This is the single most serious United States problem today. It drives me crazy that we are wasting huge amounts of resources and political capital on second-order problems while ignoring the bank problem.

Robust recovery requires banks lending to businesses. Banks can’t lend to businesses until they are adequately capitalized, and the bad assets are off the books. We will not have a robust recovery and put people back to work until our banks are fixed.

Bankruptcy is one way to clean up our banks. Since the FDIC fund is currently upside down, -8.2 billion, this would require external funds to the FDIC. The other option is the one successfully used by Sweden. They nationalized the banks, cleaned them up, and resold them. This would also require an investment.

Either way, fixing the banks is a far better use of money than some Stimulus 2 program or even the unspent portion of the current stimulus program.

I think Fed policy has been too tight. Instead of paying interest on excess deposit, they should be charging a fee. Of course, many disagree and worry about inflation, and that is what I thought I was reading as Shelton proceeds with her thesis that the Fed’s policy may be fueling a new asset bubble. This is pretty standard stuff, boringly standard in fact. I was about to quit reading and go on to something else when I came to a paragraph that stopped me cold:

“Deflation is seen as the bugaboo of Keynesian economics. But it can actually serve to spur economic activity as lower prices enable struggling consumers to get back in the game, and enterprising individuals can build businesses using tangible assets that yield valid profits.”

That paragraph is breathtaking, so wrong on so many levels, so counter to what we know to be true. I couldn’t believe that an economist would say that. So, I looked for her tag line. Sure enough, it says she’s an economist. I did a web search. She’s got at least one book out. She’s in the WSJ frequently. She’s all for a gold standard.

Shelton received her Ph.D. in Business Administration at the University of Utah, and she’s a professor at the Duxx Graduate School of Business at Monterrey, Mexico. One observer—goes by Federalist on the web, but I couldn’t find a name—described her as having few credentials. I don’t think that is exactly true. She has impressive credentials, just not as an economist.

Let’s correct her paragraph:

No one is going to mistake me for a Keynesian, but I’m certain that deflation is bad. Economists in general, not just Keynesian, know deflation is bad. I don’t know of one credible economist, from a top 50 school, with a Ph.D. in economics, who believes that deflation is not bad.

Shelton goes beyond saying deflation is not bad. She claims deflation is good, stimulative, spurring economic activity, “enabling struggling consumers to get back in the game.” Amazing.

Here’s the story on deflation: As prices fall, no one has an incentive to purchase anything, the cost will be less tomorrow; consumption and investment decline. Borrowers pay with deflated dollars, making real interest rates very high, again leading to less investment and consumption. Wages don’t adjust quickly, leading to unemployment, 25 percent in the depression. Asset values decline, but debts become more burdensome, leading to credit defaults and over-leveraged banks, businesses, and consumers. Lending, borrowing, consumption, investment, and economic activity decline.

One problem of smart people pontificating outside their field is that they come up with ideas that sound good, don’t hold up to serious analysis. Economists have performed a huge amount of research on inflation and deflation, empirical research and theoretical research. The profession has rejected the thesis that deflation is good. The risk is that someone with authority listens to someone like Shelton and tries to implement her recommendations. That would be tragic. Bad policy leads to a bad economy, and the costs of a bad economy are immense and not just financial. Serious recessions change lives, usually for the worse. Careers, families, and lives are destroyed. It is a shame that Shelton has a mouthpiece as big as the Wall Street Journal.

“Establishing financial stability—in addition to price stability and growth—is the essential role of the central bank. Achieving this goal in a way that avoids moral-hazard distortions, as with the too-big-to-fail finance institutions, and prevents another bubble in the next years will surely be one of the greatest challenges ever faced by the Fed.”

The piece is a quick and worthwhile read. It’s here.